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THE LOCAL BAKER/LOCAL BUREAUCRAT DILEMMA:
PRIVATIZATION AND POWER IN NEW YORK CITY
I. INTRODUCTION

"Whom would you rather trust to supply your bread-your local baker
or your local bureaucrat?"' That question, presented by Ronald S. Lauder,
chairman of the New York State Senate Advisory Commission on
Privatization, implies that the value of privatization should be obvious.
Certainly, phrasing the question in that way invites public support for
privatizing urban services. Most people cheer overwhelmingly for the local
baker.2 The purchase of bread, though, differs significantly from the
provision of homeless housing, road repair services, and park bench
maintenance. 3 Because of those differences, privatization concerns cannot
be reduced to "local supplier versus local bureaucrat" generalizations. 4
In the early 1990s, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani embarked
on a plan for extensive privatization of City services. 5 The City Council
viewed Giuliani's plan skeptically, much the way they might have viewed
Lauder's simplistic "local supplier versus local bureaucrat" distinction. 6
In an attempt to get the mayor's attention and to challenge the rapid
expansion of privatization, the Council passed Local Law 35 of 1994 over

1. Ronald S. Lauder, Executive Summary, in PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK:
COMPETING FORA BETTER FUTURE, A REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE ADVISORY

COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION vii, ix (1992).
2. See DONALD F. KETTL, SHARING POWER 1 (1993) ("Americans have long had a
reverence for private markets to match their dislike of public power.").
3. See Janet C. Fisher, Reinventing a Livelihood: How the UnitedStates LaborLaws,
Labor-ManagementCooperationInitiatives,and PrivatizationInfluence PublicSectorLabor
Markets, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557, 559-60 (1997).
4. See id. at 563-65.
5. See, e.g., Karen Pallarito, Report Questions Logic of N.Y. Plan, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, May 22, 1995, at 17 (reporting on Mayor Giuliani's plan to privatize several
City hospitals); John Shanahan, Giuliani Seeks More Spending Cuts: Budget Would Also
Trim Jobs, RECORD (Northern N.J.), Apr. 28, 1995, at A4 (describing Mayor Giuliani's
plan to reduce the City's work force by 4,000, partly through privatization).
6. Interview of Richard Weinberg, Director and General Counsel, and Jay Damashek,
Assistant Director, Office of the General Counsel, Legal and Governmental Affairs
Division, New York City Council, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter
Interview of Weinberg and Damashek].
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a mayoral veto.7 Local Law 35 became New York City Charter
("Charter") section 312(a), amending the 1989 Charter with respect to
contracts for City services. 8
The stated intent of Local Law 35 and section 312(a) is to ensure that
New York City promotes the efficient purchasing of City services. 9
However, the complete picture of section 312(a) may not be found in this
statement of legislative intent.10 This Note will explore the authority for
privatization decisions in New York City, and the exercise of that authority
over the last four years. It will consider the role of section 312(a) and
other efforts to demand accountability for privatization decisions. Finally,
this Note will discuss possible Charters which could improve accountability
for privatization decisions and promote the efficient purchasing of City
services.
Authority for privatization decisions is best discussed within the
context of power in New York City. Therefore, Part II I of this Note
reviews the historical power structure of New York City government. Part
11112 introduces privatization in New York City in the 1990s, paying
particular attention to the impact of shifts in decision-making authority.
Part IV 3 considers the legal limitations on accountability for privatization
decisions in New York City. Finally, Part V' 4 reviews implications of the
foregoing discussion for future revisions of the New York City power
structure.
II. PRIVATIZATION AND POWER IN NEW YORK CITY

Privatization decisions are often fleshed out in conflict.'" Public sector

7. See NEW YORK, N.Y., COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, Reports of
the Committee on Governmental Operations: Privatization of City Employees, in NEW
YORK CITYLEGISLATIVEANNUAL, Loc. L. No. 35 (Jun. 14, 1994) [hereinafter COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS].
8. See id.; N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13

§ 312(a) (1989).
9. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 7.
10. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
11. See infra notes 15-65 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 66-135 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 136-202 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Nancy Buonanno Grennan, A LegalRoadmap to PrivatizingGovernment
Services in Washington State, 72 WASH. L. REV. 153, 154 (1997) (describing conflicting
interests at stake in the privatization movement of Washington State); Mark Hazelbaker &
David C. Hertel, Privatizationandthe "PrimarilyRelated" Test: A Casefor Clarification,
74 MARQ. L. REV. 451, 457-58 (1991) (discussing tensions resulting from conflicting
interests in the Milwaukee School Choice Program).
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employees demand job security.' 6 Private enterprise demands the benefits
of a free market economy. 7 The public demands the efficient provision of
services.'" However, in New York City, the conflicts inherent in
privatization decisions often remain below the surface of city life.' 9
Privatization results in contracts. In New York City, contract authority
lies squarely with the mayor.2' Despite the diverse and conflicting interests
at stake, executive privatization decisions are seldom contested.2" Because
privatization decisions generally favor private enterprise, the private sector
has little reason to complain. 2 Public-sector agencies and employees who
may want to protest those decisions have little opportunity for more than
a half-hearted squawk.23 On the other hand, city residents who have the
opportunity to respond only minimally exercise that opportunity and rarely,
if ever, significantly influence privatization decisions. The distribution
of power within New York City, therefore, prevents the escalation of
conflicts that could remind decision-makers that privatization decisions
must balance differing interests and cannot be based on simplistic "local
vendor versus bureaucrat" generalizations?25

16. See Grennan, supra note 15, at 155-63.
17. See Hearing on Int. No. 120-A Before the Council Committee on Governmental
Operations (New York, N.Y., Feb. 14, 1994) (statement of James P. Gifford, Executive
Vice President, New York City Partnership & New York Chamber of Commerce and
Industry) [hereinafter Gifford Statement].
18. See KETL, supra note 2, at 1-6 (stating that the primary rationale put forth by
proponents of privatization is that private enterprise promises greater efficiency).
19. Uncommon alliances develop from a sense of powerlessness and prevent tensions
from rising to the surface. For example, Thomas G. Rozinski, Counsel, New York City
Department of Parks & Recreation, reported that tensions typically considered inherent
between City agencies and public-sector labor unions remained below the surface because
the unions sensed that the alternative to cooperate with City agencies was the loss of
additional jobs to participants in the Work Experience Program. See Thomas G. Rozinski,
Address at New York Law School (Feb. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Rozinski Address].
20. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 372 (1989).
21. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
22. See Gifford Statement, supra note 17.
23. See Rozinski Address, supra note 19.
24. See James W. Lowe, Examination of GovernmentalDecentralizationin New York
City and a New Model for Implementation, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173, 179-94 (1990)
(documenting the scarcity of persons participating in the democratic process of seeking
change through political action).
25. See Jonas Prager & Swati Desai, Privatizing Local Government Operations:
Lessonsfrom FederalContractingoutMethodology, PUBLIC PRODUCTIVITY &MGMT. REV.,
Dec. 1996, at 185 (1996) ("[O]ne should avoid the knee-jerk reaction that claims that
contracting out will always prove more efficient and more effective than services provided
by the municipality itself.").
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A. An Overview of the History of Power in New York City
New York City had solid practical reasons to concentrate contract
authority in the hands of the executive. 26 Since the City's incorporation in
1897, City leaders believed that a strong mayoralty was integral to action

fear that any limitation on mayoral
and accountability. 27 Even today, 2some
8

authority could paralyze the City.
In 1989, City leaders and the Charter Revision Commission had
historical reasons for confirming a strong mayoralty.2 9 Until 1821, the
30
governor of New York State had selected the mayor of New York City.
Even after popular election of the mayor was established, the State
continued to interfere in the City's affairs. 3' The state legislature controlled
administrative appointments. 32 The legislature also controlled the City
budget by creating the Board of Estimates and Apportionment
and by
,3
authorizing the governor to appoint a majority of the Board's members.
The popularly elected mayor did not gain control of the Board until
1893, when the corporation counsel, a mayoral appointee, was added to the
Board. 34 New Yorkers longed for freedom from state interference. 35 Thus,
when the City Charter was revised in 1897, the Charter Commission
viewed strong mayoral rule as a vehicle to keep the state out of City

26. See Viewpoints, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 10, 1997, at A42 (asserting that any
power structure for New York City which does not concentrate power in the hands of the
mayor could paralyze the City government).
27. See Joseph P. Viteritti, The Tradition of MunicipalReform: CharterRevision in
Historical Context, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 16, 20 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds.,
1989) ("[T]he government that came into existence in 1898 gave its [mayor] more
institutional power than the mayor in any other major American city ever had and perhaps
will [have] .... The city took the reformist model of a strong mayoralty to an extreme, the
assumption being that accountability could be achieved by concentrating responsibility.").
28. See Viewpoints, supra note 26; Gene Russianoff, CharterRevision Revs Up,
CITYLAW, (Center for N.Y. City Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Jan./Feb. 1998,
at 1.
29. For a more complete history of New York City government, see generally
FREDERICK SHAW, HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY LEGISLATURE (1954); WALLACE S.
SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY: POLITICS IN THE METROPOLIS

(W.W.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Norton & Co. 1965) (1960).
See Viteritti, supra note 27, at 17.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 19.
See SHAW, supra note 29, at 4.
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affairs.36 The Commission gave the mayor of New York City greater
institutional power than the mayor of any other major American city.37
While the seeds of a strong mayoral government were sown in colonial
history, the structure of New York City government as we know it today
was not established until the 1935 Charter increased the concentration of
authority in the executive.3 ' Thus a trend began which continued into the
1960s. 39
As the executive gained authority, the City Council lost it.40 All
actions of the City Council that reduced revenue or affected City employees
were subject to approval by the Board of Estimate before submission to the
mayor. 4' The Board of Estimates and Apportionment, renamed simply the
Board of Estimate, lost legislative status but retained the power to set
salaries, approve franchises, and authorize the sale or lease of City
property. 42 New York City government settled into the structure of a weak
City Council, an executive board of directors, and a very strong
executive.43 The authority to award contracts was in the hands of the
executive."
No countervailing power existed to challenge those
decisions.45
B. Challenges to the City's Power Structure
Opportunity to revise the power structure in New York City arose in the
1980S. 46 Two challenges to the structure of the City's representative
institutions were heard in the United States District Court. In 1981, Judge
Edward R. Neaher of the Eastern District of New York determined in
Andrews v. Koch that the practice of electing two at-large City Council
members by a limited nomination and limited voting process violated the

36. See Viteritti, supra note 27, at 24-25.
37. The mayor controlled the budget process by appointing three of the five seats on
the Board of Estimates and Apportionment. See Viteritti, supra note 27, at 20. The
mayor's "role in the local legislative process was fully established by the fact that it took
five-sixths of the vote of both houses of the legislature to override [a mayoral veto]." Id.
38.

See id. at 25-26.

39. See id. at 26.

40. See id.
41.

See id.

42. See id.
43. See id. at 19, 26; Lowe, supra note 24, at 175-76.
44. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 310 (1989).
45.

See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.

46. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 173-74.
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constitutional standard of "one-person, one-vote. "47 Less than one month
later, the New York Civil Liberties Union challenged the structure of the
Board of Estimate under the same constitutional standard.48
The District Court in Morris v. Board of Estimate concluded that the
"one-person, one-vote" standard did not apply to the Board because the
Board was not a legislative body.4 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that decision and remanded the case for a determination of
whether the Board was substantially malapportioned.
In 1984, Judge
Neaher determined that the Board was indeed malapportioned, but he
allowed the City additional time to present justifications for the Board's
structure.5 Two years later, Neaher ordered the City to correct the
unconstitutional structure "with all deliberate speed." 52
The Andrews and Morris decisions set the stage for restructuring the
City power structure. 3 Two commissions were established to develop a
proposed revision of the City Charter.54 The 1989 Charter revisions,
approved by popular vote in November 1989, rearranged the structure of
City government significantly. 5 The Board of Estimate was abolished and
the number of City Council seats increased from thirty-five to fifty-one. 6
The resulting power shift, however, only placed more concentrated control
in the hands of the executive. 7

47. See Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246, 252 (E.D.N.Y 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d
815 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 459 U.S. 810 (1982).

48. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
49. See id. at 657.
50. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686, 691 (2d Cir. 1983).
51. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1477 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd, 831 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
52. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp 1463, 1479 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); see also
Joyce Purnick, City Estimate Board Orderedto EstablishOne Man, One Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1986, at Al (providing a contemporary reaction to Judge Neaher's decision).
53. Shortly after the Andrews decision, Mayor Koch appointed a Charter Revision
Commission chaired by Michael I. Sovern, president of Columbia University. After the
Morris decision, Koch appointed Richard Ravitch to chair a second Commission charged
with recommending appropriate changes in the structure of City government. See Gerald
Benjamin & Frank J. Mauro, The Reemergence of Municipal Reform, in RESTRUCTURING
THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT:

THE REEMERGENCE OF MUNICIPAL REFORM, 1,

3

(Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989).
54. See id. at 3-7.
55. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 175.

56. See Joseph P. Viteritti, The New Charter: Will It Make A Difference?, in URBAN
POLITICS NEW YORK STYLE 413, 421 (1990).
57. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 173.
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Prior to the Charter revision, the five borough presidents had
substantial input regarding the City budget.5 8 After the revision, their input
was reduced to the right to make recommendations regarding five percent
of the expense and capital budgets. 9
The city council president's authority was also significantly reduced
under the revised Charter. 6° Today, the council president's rather nebulous
new role involves few substantive activities.61
The powers lost by the borough presidents and the city council
president did not increase the power of the City Council.62 Instead,
significant powers became more firmly concentrated in the hands of the
executive.
The Council gained no authority over the coveted area of
contracting. 64 As the executive retained full control65over contracting, it
also retained full control over privatization decisions.
III: THE PRIVATIZATION TREND AND NEW YORK CITY
A. General Trends Toward Privatization
By the late 1980s, cities throughout the United States were struggling
to satisfy demands for increased public services within the limits of
severely constrained revenues. 6 City leaders searched for innovative
alternatives to publicly provided services.67 Privatization became one
solution of growing popularity.68

58. See id. at 175 n.14.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 175-76.
61. The council president now fulfills only two significant roles. First, the president
chairs a commission on public information. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 47 § 1061 (1989).
Second, the president votes in the event of a tie among the council members. See id. ch.
2 § 24(e).
62. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 176.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 174.
65. Contracting authority is not among the enunciated powers of the Council. Other
than the mayor, only the comptroller has any authority related to contracting. See N.Y.
CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 28; ch. 13 § 326 (1989).
66. See Prager & Desai, supra note 25, at 185; E.S. Savas, Introduction, in
PRIVATIZATION FOR NEW YORK: COMPETING FOR A BETTER FUTURE, A REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK STATE SENATE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION 3

67. See Prager & Desai, supra note 25, at 185.
68. See Savas, supra note 66, at 3.

(1992).
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Privatization passes ownership of something publicly held to the private
sector. 69 The item owned may be tangible, such as a piece of property, or
intangible, such as the right to provide a particular public service. 7' This
approach destroys governmental monopolies and allows market competition
7
to determine issues related to the provision of public services. '

Privatization can take many forms, including but not limited to,

allowing private industry to bid competitively for contracts, awarding
franchises for service provision or infrastructure management, and
subsidizing services through voucher programs.72 Privatization can also
involve the sale of government-owned assets and deregulation of particular
services areas, allowing private entrepreneurs to displace public-service
monopolies .'3
By 1994, New York City confronted a $ 2.3 billion budget deficit74 and
a growing demand for increased efficiency in the provision of City
services.75
The political and economic situation was ripe for
privatization.76 Mayor Giuliani did not hesitate. 7 The City embarked on
a series of extensive privatization initiatives.78

69. See id.
70. See Lauder, supra note 1, at vii.
71. See id.
72. See Savas, supra note 66, at 3.
73. See id.
74. See Hearingon Int. No. 120-A Before the Committee on GovernmentalOperations
(New York, N.Y., Feb. 14, 1994) (statement of Peter J. Powers, Deputy Mayor for
Operations) [hereinafter Powers Statement].
75. See Hearingon Int. No. 120-A Before the Committee on GovernmentalOperations
(New York, N.Y., Feb. 14, 1994) (statement of Dean M. Mead, Senior Research
Associate, Citizens Budget Commission).
76. See generally Blanche Blank, Bureaucracy: Powerin Details, in URBAN POLITICS
NEW YORK STYLE 107, 107-41 (Jewel Bellush & Dick Netzer eds., 1990).
77. See Richard M. Weinberg, An Overview of the Administration's Privatization
Initiatives 3-9 (Mar. 1995) (unpublished brief on file with the Committee on Governmental
Operations).
78. By early 1995, the City's privatization initiatives included: maintenance services
for two park districts in the Bronx and two park districts in Queens; plumbing, painting, and
electrical services at parks throughout the five boroughs; management of eleven adult
shelters, two pre-natal shelters, and two family shelters; outreach services for homeless
single adults; health services for homeless families and single persons; a supportive work
program for substance abusers in recovery; education and enrollment services regarding
Medicaid Managed Care; street resurfacing in Queens; location services for parents
delinquent in child-support payments; data entry services; facility maintenance at 221
firehouses; traffic signal repair; preparation of tax bills; management and operation of jail
facilities; management and operation of wastewater treatment plants; water meter reading
services; mailroom services; repair and recharging of fire department masks; computer
programming; publishing services; vehicle maintenance; building renovations; parking
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City community leaders and governmental officials were divided over
the possible effects of this increase in privatization. Mayor Giuliani
believed that competition would boost government productivity while
reasonably limiting expenses. 9 Union leaders worried that increased
privatization would destroy public-sector job security.8" City Council
leaders claimed to fear not privatization but the concentration of authority
for privatization decisions. 8 ' In that setting, the Council took up
consideration of Introductory No. 120-A, the bill which would become
Local Law 35 of 1994 and would amend the City Charter in the area of
procurement of contracts. 82
B. Local Law 35 of 1994
Local Law 35 of 1994 ("Local Law 35") applies to all technical,
consulting, or personal service contracts valued above $100,000.83 Under
this law, a City agency intending to solicit bids or proposals for delivery
of services must first ascertain whether any City employee will be displaced
by the plan to contract out the work. 84 The agency must then notify the
comptroller of the result.8' If displacement will occur, the agency must
analyze the costs and benefits associated with delivery of this service using
City workers.8 6 This analysis must be submitted to the City Council and
to the representative of the affected collective bargaining unit.87
Once a decision to contract out the work has been made, the
contracting agency follows the City's usual solicitation practices and makes

garages. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 3-9.
79.

See Powers Statement, supra note 74.

80. See Hearing on Int. No. 120-A Before the Committee on Governmental Operations
(New York, N.Y., Feb. 14, 1994) (statement of Stanley Hill, Executive Director, District
Council 37, AFSCME AFL-CIO) [hereinafter Hill Statement].
81. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
82. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 7, at 3-9; N.Y.
CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 312(a) (1989).
83. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 7, at 2.
84. Displacement is defined as "any employment action that results in a reduction in
the number of funded positions including but not limited to, those resulting from the layoff;
demotion; bumping; involuntary transfer to a new class, title, or location; time-based
reductions, or reductions in customary hours of work, wages, or benefits of any city
employee." N.Y. CITY CHARTERch. 13 § 312(a)(8) (1989, as amended 1994); NEWYORK,
N.Y., COMPETITION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, CITY OF NEW YORK GUIDELINES FOR
PUBLIC/PRIVATE COMPETITION 10 (1995) [hereinafter COMPETITION COORDINATING
COMMITTEE].
85. See COMPETITION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 84, at 10.

86.

See id.

87.

See id.
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its decision regarding the preferred method of service delivery in
88
accordance with the guidelines of the Procurement Policy Board ("PPB").
The PPB, as established by the 1989 Charter, is a five-member panel with
the authority to define regulations regarding solicitation; contract award,
administration, and oversight; contract dispute resolution; and the form and
content of agency contract records . 9 The PPB is largely controlled by the
mayor as he appoints three of its five members; the remaining two seats are
appointed by the publicly elected comptroller. 90
After deciding to award a contract, the agency head must present the
reasons for that decision and all supporting documentation to the
comptroller, the City Council, and collective bargaining unit
representatives. 9 The Council may conduct a public hearing within thirty
days of the proposed contract; 92 no contract may be awarded before the
Council has had the opportunity to conduct this hearing.9 3
C. Controversy SurroundingLocal Law 35
Before its passage, Local Law 35 engendered much controversy.94
Supporters included the Committee On Governmental Operations and
District Council 37.95 The strongest opposition came from the executive
branch of City government and from representatives of private enterprise. 96
The Committee On Governmental Operations opined that the bill would
allow the City to assess thoroughly the cost efficiency and quality impact
of contracts.9 7 The Committee believed the bill would improve resident
involvement in the service-delivery process by mandating notice and
opportunities for public hearings on contracts. 98
District Council 37 ("DC 37"), the largest labor union representing
City employees,' was primarily concerned with the preservation of public

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 311(b) (1989).
89. See id.
90. See id.§ 311(a).
88.

91.
92.
93.

See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 7, at 10.
See id.
See id. at 10-11.
See Hill Statement, supra note 80.

94.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 7.

See id.
See David L. Gregory, Br(e)akingthe Exploitation ofLabor?:Tensions Regarding
the Welfare Workforce, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 28 (1997) (referencing a statement by
D.C. 37's executive director and counting the union's membership at more than 120,000
civilian members).
98.
99.
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sectorjob security." ° DC 37's perspective was expressed by Stanley Hill,
its executive director.'' Hill believed that the process defined in Local
Law 35 would lead to contract decisions that favored public employees.'0 2
He hoped that the cost/benefit studies required by Local Law 35 would
vindicate City employees. 0 3 Hill also believed that serious cost/benefit
analyses would show that the City's inability to adequately supervise
contractors would be revealed as the source of waste. City employees
would be recognized as efficient."'4 As long as the cost/benefit analyses
could demonstrate that economic benefits would not be achieved through
privatization, DC 37 believed that public-sector job security would be
preserved.'0 5
On the other side of the debate, the New York City Partnership & New
York Chamber of Commerce and Industry ("Partnership") opposed Local
Law 35.106 Jim Gifford, executive vice president of the Partnership,
professed to agree with the goal of increased privatization. 07 However,
Gifford, speaking for the Partnership, argued that Local Law 35 was biased
in favor of protecting the government monopoly.l10 Gifford argued that
true cost/benefit analyses must be based on a system of cost accounting that
the City did not have in place. 01 9 From the perspective of the Partnership,
Local Law 35's definition of "displacement" was evidence of a bias in
favor of protecting the government monopoly and public-sector
employees. I0 In sum, Gifford argued that the proposed legislation would
increase the City's bureaucratic red tape and would require decisions based
on misinformation.l"
The Giuliani administration joined the opposition. 112 Peter Powers,
Deputy Mayor for Operations, expressed the executive's concern that Local
Law 35 would unnecessarily circumscribe the administration's efforts to

100. See Hill Statement, supra note 80.
101. See id.

102. See id.
103.

See id.

104. See id.
105. See id.
106.

See Gifford Statement, supra note 17.

107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Gifford was concerned with three particular forms of misinformation: (1) the
misinformation inherent in cost/benefit analyses conducted before a reliable cost accounting

system was in use by the city; (2) the misinformation promoted by the overly broad
definition of "displacement;" and (3) the misinformation resulting from the required use of
city wage and benefit scales when calculating the private sector cost of services. See id.
112. See Powers Statement, supra note 74, at 1-2.
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provide quality City services at affordable prices. 113 Early in 1994, Mayor
Giuliani had articulated a plan to promote competition for the right to
deliver certain City services. 114 The plan included a privatization approach
referred to as "managed competition.""l' New York City Charter section
319 allows the City to solicit a request for proposals whenever it plans to
award a contract for services. 1 16 Under the managed competition plan,
proposals would be submitted not only by private enterprise but also by
City agencies determined to compete against the private sector.17 Clearly,
any viable proposal submitted by a City agency must be appreciably.
different from the current agency structure or service provision plan. 1 8
Otherwise, the proposal would be nothing more than a rearticulation of a
plan the City would have already considered and rejected in the cost/benefit
analysis phase." 9 Under the managed competition plan, then, any
qualifying proposal submitted by a City agency will receive the same
consideration as proposals submitted by private vendors. 2 '
The Giuliani administration also viewed Local Law 35 as generally
The law requires hearings that are already mandated by
burdensome.'
PPB rules under New York City Charter section 326. '" It requires that the
cost/benefit analysis consider the cost of training displaced workers. 123 It
also requires that the wages and benefits of City employees be calculated
as the wages and benefits of private contractors when considering privatesector bids. 24
Since the Giuliani administration had clearly expressed the belief that
no benefit was to be gained through Local Law 35, it was not surprising
that on June 10, 1994, the mayor vetoed the bill passed by the City Council
Since the City Council strongly objected to
on May 12, 1994.1'
uncontested mayoral control of privatization decisions, it is also not
surprising that the Council overrode his veto nine days later. 2 6 Thus,

113.
114.

See id. at 1-5
See id. at 1.

115.

See COMPETITION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 84, at 2 (defining the

term "managed competition").
116. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 319 (1989).
117. See COMPETITION COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 84, at 2.
118. See Rozinski Address, supra note 19.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Powers Statement, supra note 74.
122. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 326 (1989).

123.

See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.

124. See id.
125.
126.

See COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL
See id.

OPERATIONS,

supra note 7.
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Intro. 120-A became Local Law 35 of 1994, later amending
the New York
127
City Charter and becoming Charter section 312 (a).
D. Giuliani'sGuidelines For Public/PrivateCompetition
In June 1994, New York City averaged 9,000 contracts per year,
representing approximately one-fourth of the City's budget.12 Contrary to
the hopes of DC 37, the passage of section 312(a) had not restricted the
City's privatization efforts.' 29 Jay Damashek, assistant director of the
Office of the General Counsel, estimates that the City Council receives ten
notices of intent to contract each day.130 Of these, nearly all include a
"Certificate of No Effect," stating that the contract will not result in the
Privatization promoters, then,
displacement of any City employees.'
312(a) without becoming
appear to have found a way to live with section
32
overly inconvenienced by its requirements. 1
In the intervening years, the City Council has made no effort to
determine whether section 312(a) is achieving its stated purpose of
"ensur[ing] sound procurement practice and the delivery of high quality
services in the most cost-efficient manner." 133 Simultaneously, the
executive branch has taken full advantage of its authority over
privatization. 3 4 In October 1995, the Office of Operations, an office of the
executive branch, published guidelines to be used by city managers faced
with alternative service-delivery considerations.135 The guidelines are a
helpful tool for city managers who want to pursue privatization yet need to
proceed within the formalities of section 312(a). They do not, however,
help a city manager evaluate whether a particular contract serves the true
interests of the city.

127.
128.

See id.
See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.

129. See id.
130. See id.
131.

See Rozinski Address, supra note 19; Interview of Weinberg and Damashek,

supra note 6. Certificates of No Effect are required under N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 §
312(a) (1989).
132. See Rozinski Address, supra note 19.

133.

See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.

134. See id.
135.

See COMPETITION COORDINATING

COMMITTEE,

supra note 84, at 10-23.

1176

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 42

IV. REALITY CHECK: ARE THERE ANY ACTUAL RESTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTIVE POWER OVER PRIVATIZATION IN NEW YORK CITY?

Restraints on executive authority over privatization decisions mirror
restraints on executive authority in general. Such restraints come in three
forms: procedural restraints, power structure restraints, and political
process restraints. 136 Procedural restraints prevent an executive action from
going forward until particular steps have taken place.'3 7 Power structure
restraints are checks and balances built into the structure of the
government.13 8 Political process restraints are found in the exercise of the
right to vote in a democratic society. 3 9
A. ProceduralRestraints
New York City Charter sections 312(a) and 326 attempt to exercise
procedural restraints over privatization decisions. 40 However, each section
results only in a formality that can be satisfied without any serious
assessment of the decision to privatize.' 4
The City Council believes that the procedural requirements of section
312(a) have been satisfied in virtually all contract awards since October
1994, the date the legislation took effect. 4 2 However, satisfaction of
procedural requirements may constitute a mere formality, as exemplified
by the process followed in the privatization of homeless shelters. 13
Seven homeless shelters were among the first projects the City intended
to privatize after section 312(a) took effect.' The City desired to contract
out the management of the shelters because it believed that not-for-profit
agencies could manage them at a lower cost. 45 The City envisioned that
part of the savings would result from a reduction in the number of "life

136. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6. Mr. Weinberg and Mr.
Damashel stated that the current New York City Charter authorizes the City Council only
to design procedural restraints on the executive's contract authority. The Council is not

authorized to check the mayor's authority over contracts; the Council also cannot force city
residents to exercise their political process restraints on this mayoral authority. See id.

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 175 n. 14, 175-76.
140. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
141. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 154-70.
142. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
143. See Telephone interview with Paul LoPato, New York City Independent Budget
Office (Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter LoPato Interview].
144. See Weinberg, supra note 77, at 3-6.
145. See LoPato Interview, supra note 143.
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skills trainers" employed at the shelters.146 However, if the planned
reduction in staff was effected at the time of contract execution, the
Department of Homeless Services would have had to admit that contracting
out would result in displacement of City workers.' 4 7 Such an admission
148
would have subjected the contracting out decision to detailed scrutiny.
To avoid such scrutiny, the Department of Homeless Services submitted a
Certificate of No Effect with the Notice of Intent to Contract. 4 9 Thus, the

department certified that contracting out would result in no displacement
of City workers, even though it knew that, after privatization, the not-forprofit agencies would effect the necessary staff reductions.' 5 0
While the Department of Homeless Services fulfilled the letter of the
law, it sidestepped the Council's expressed concern regarding displacement
of City workers.' 5 ' Clearly, the procedural restraints quickly became mere
formalities. 5 a As mere formalities, they provide no realistic check on
executive authority over privatization decisions.' 53
B. Power Structure Restraints
Power restraints on executive authority are those that constitute a
formal system of checks and balances.' 5 4 The 1989 Charter included only
the barest minimum of such checks and balances.' 5 5 These minimal power
restraints are found in the authority of the comptroller and in the oversight
authority of the City Council.' 5 6 Neither the powers of the comptroller nor
the oversight powers of the City Council provide an effective power
restraint on the executive's decision-making authority over privatization."'
New York City Charter section 93 authorizes the comptroller "to audit
and to investigate all matters relating to or affecting the finances of the

146. See id.
147. See id.
148.
149.

See id.
See id.

150. See id.
151.

See id.

152.

See id.

153.

See id.

154. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
155. See discussion infra note 161 and text accompanying notes 180-96.
156. The powers of the comptroller are defined in Charter section 93. See N.Y. CITY
CHARTER ch. 2 § 93 (1989). Additional duties relating to the award of contracts are
specified in Charter section 328. See id. ch. 13 § 328. The oversight authority of the City
Council is articulated in Charter section 29. See id. ch. 2 § 29.
157. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
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City, including without limitation the performance of contracts." 58 Section
328 sets the parameters within which the comptroller can interfere with the
award of a contract. 5 9 Generally, contracts cannot be implemented until
the awarding agency has filed a copy with the comptroller and the
comptroller has registered the contract. 16
In very limited circumstances, 161 the comptroller may refuse to register
a contract within thirty days of the agency filing. 62 Outside of those
circumstances, the comptroller can also object to the registration of the
contract by writing to the mayor.' 63 However, the mayor may still require
that the comptroller register the contract."6 At best, then, the comptroller
has a maximum of forty days during which to delay the award of a
contract.' 65 Thus, the comptroller's responsibility does not restrain the
executive power to award privatization contracts. 166
The City Council is empowered to investigate "any matters within its
jurisdiction relating to the property, affairs, or government of the city." 67
The Council is also charged with regular and continuous review of the
affairs of City agencies.16 8 Certainly, then, the Council can investigate and
oversee the award of privatization contracts. 69 However, noticeably absent
from Council authority is the power to take concrete action to prevent, or
even to delay, the award of a contract. Therefore, even if the Council,
through its oversight and investigation powers, were to determine a
particular contract to be problematic, it would be powerless to prevent the
0
execution of that contract. 17

158. N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 5 § 93(b) (1989).
159. See id. ch. 13 § 328.

160. See id. § 328(a).
161. The comptroller may withhold registration if: (1) unexpended and unapplied
appropriated funds are insufficient to pay for the contract; (2) the required certifications
have not been made; or (3) the proposed contractor is prohibited from receipt of City
contracts. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 13 § 328(b) (1989).
162. See id.
163. See id. § 328(c).

164. See id. The comptroller is required to register the contract within 10 days after
a directive from the mayor. See id.
165. See id.
166.

See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.

167. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 2 § 29(a)(1) (1989).
168. See id. § 29(a)(2).

169. See id. § 29.
170. See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
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C. PoliticalProcess Restraints on Executive Authority
The remaining hope for restraint on executive authority of privatization
decisions is found in the political process.17' However, political process
restraints over executive privatization decisions will only be as effective as
the political process itself is at a given moment in time."
A belief in political process restraints underlies the concern for fair
representation mirrored in the Andrews and Morris decisions. 73 Citizens
can effect change through exercising their right to vote. 74 In an ideal
world, New York City residents could effectively impact the privatization
decisions of the executive simply by participating in the political process. 75
Democratic governance in New York City, indeed in most of the
United States, is far from this ideal. 176 Voter participation in the United
States is lower than in any other democratic country."' Decision-making
authority and control over local matters has increasingly shifted to the
hands of the State and away from the hands of the local people. 7 1 Vehicles
commonly used by the populace to express discontent with executive
79
decisions have found their effectiveness reduced by this power shift. 1
Two particular vehicles in New York City illustrate this point. First,
the office of a borough president is no longer a vehicle for concrete action
in response to popular concerns. 80 Second, public-sector labor unions are
no longer vehicles that can protect against a force detrimental to City
employees. 8 '
Tremendous power is wielded through budget control. 8 2 Borough
presidents once had substantial input regarding the City budget.' 83
However, the 1989 Charter revision relegated them to the role of
"recommenders" concerning budget matters. 4 They have, thus, been
rendered ineffective vehicles for serious change.' 85
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See Lowe, supra note 24, at 173-78.
See id.
See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
See Lowe, supra note 24, at 217.
See id.
See id. at 176.
See id. at 177.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 175.
See Rozinski Address, supra note 19.
See Interview of Weinberg and Damashek, supra note 6.
See Lowe, supra note 24, at 177.
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Whereas limitations on the role of borough presidents arose from local
action in the Charter revision, limitations on the ability of public-sector
unions toprotect the rights of City employees arose from state and federal
actions."S Public concern regarding the escalating public burden of welfare
promoted the development of various "workfare" programs.1 7 New York
State was no exception.' 8
New York State required that beneficiaries of the Home Relief
program, the welfare program for single persons, work a maximum of
twenty hours per week.8 9 New York City incorporated this requirement
into the "Work Experience Program" ("WEP").'" Before long, New York
City was searching for sites at which WEP participants might be
employed. 19'
The WEP program raised new concerns among public sector
employees.' 92 Employment of WEP participants could reduce the cost of
City services and mightjeopardize public sector job security.' 93 The City's
public sector unions had hoped that greater job security would result from
the cost/benefit analyses required by section 312(a).' 94 WEP brought
unions face-to-face with a new source of job insecurity. 195 This insecurity,
resulting from federal and state workfare mandates, reduced the City's
unions ability to function as a vehicle for protection of public sector
employment interests. '16
D. Are Effective Restraints Necessary and Possible?
Efforts to establish procedural restraints, power structure restraints,
and political process restraints on executive power to award privatization
contracts have proven unsuccessful.197 However, New York City citizens

186. See Fisher, supra note 3, at 558-60.
187. See, e.g., Cerisse Anderson, Suit Barredby Recipient ofHome Relief. Workers'
Compensation Is Sole Remedy for Injury, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1990, at 1 (describing a
welfare recipient who was made to work with the sanitation department inexchange for his

benefits).
188. See id.
189. See Brukhman v. Giuliani, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1997).

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See Rozinski Address, supra note 19.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

196. See id.
197. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 154-70.
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do not have to concede unrestrained executive authority over privatization
contracts.' 9 Indeed, such a concession could be dangerous, as every city
has learned through instances of executive corruption.'99
Meaningful, effective restraints that do not paralyze the City can be
developed br a serious effort to revive citizen participation in local
Both the City Council and the mayor are taking steps
government.
toward a new Charter revision.2 ' This moment may provide the
opportunity to devise a City governance structure that seeks accountability
through increased citizen participation rather than through total
concentration of authority.2 2 Any upcoming Charter Revision Commission
must be willing to promote participatory democracy as a viable means of
checking executive authority without paralyzing the City.
V. CONCLUSION

The privatization movement sweeping the world is not likely to come
to an abrupt halt.20 3 Cities will continue to struggle with both demands for
increased services and budget limitations.'2 4 New York City will not be an
exception. 25
Recognizing that the privatization movement is here to stay, the New
York City Council expressed a valid concern regarding the purchasing of
City services. 2 6 New York City Charter section 312(a) is the Council's
attempt to guarantee the wisdom of privatization decisions.20 7 However,
312(a) has amounted to little more than a reporting
Charter section
201
0
It is incapable of achieving its stated legislative purpose. 20
requirement.
As long as there are no effective procedural, power structure, or
political process restraints on the executive authority to make privatization
decisions, the value of privatization decisions relies solely on the integrity
and wisdom of the executive.2 0 Fear of paralysis is likely to preserve the

198. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 140-53.

199. See Ross Sandier, CharterRevision and Crises, CityLaw, (Center for N.Y. City
Law, N.Y.L. Sch., New York, N.Y.), Jan./Feb. 1998, at 2.
200. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 215.
201. See Russianoff, supra note 28, at 3.
202. See Lowe, supra note 24, at 173-75.
203. See Prager & Desai, supra note 25.
204. See id.
205. See discussion supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
206. See discussion supra notes 74-135 and accompanying text.
207. See id.
208. See discussion supra notes 136-202 and accompanying text.
209. See id.
210. See id.
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heavy concentration of authority for privatization decisions in the executive
branch.2 1 1 However, that concentration of authority can co-exist with the
resurrection of popular democracy. 212 Community groups can be integrated
into the City power structure; they can have input into privatization
decisions, with a resulting benefit to all.21 3
Would we rather buy bread from our local baker or our local
bureaucrat? Given a real opportunity to discuss the question, the citizens
of New York would likely recognize that the question is deceptively
simple. Just as it is unwise to rely totally on the integrity and wisdom of
one person, it is unwise to assume there is one correct direction to
privatization questions. Privatization questions touch the daily lives of
New Yorkers. New York City will find its wisest answers by devolving
some responsibility for deciding matters that touch people's lives to the
people themselves. We stand to gain both the wisdom of the masses and
a revitalization of our democracy.
Genevieve Bishop
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